Velocity ProsperityVP2.0, the opening

No. 08 of 15The mechanism

Who decides

Holders vote, and each added vote costs more than the one before.

  • “a vote of one unit may accordingly cost one token, and a vote of two units may cost four tokens.”
  • Claim 10 makes the cost “a square of the number of votes cast”.
  • A proposal passes on a quorum with more yes votes than no. When it passes, the tokens locked on the yes side are consumed and the no side’s refunded; when it fails, both sides are refunded.
  • The fund pays out only if its balance “would remain at or above a reserve floor”.

Holders vote on changes. Each added vote on a ballot costs more than the one before, which, in the specification’s words, “may reduce a marginal influence gained by a single token holder”.

Votes cast and their token cost
VotesTokensScaleBasis
11Specification
24Specification
39Claim 10
416Claim 10
525Claim 10
10100Claim 10

“the nonlinear function is equal to a square of the number of votes cast in the vote; the governance subsystem is configured to determine that the proposal has passed responsive to a participation rate meeting or exceeding a governance quorum and a total number of yes votes exceeding a total number of no votes; and”

“As an illustrative, non-limiting example, a vote of one unit may accordingly cost one token, and a vote of two units may cost four tokens.”

“Determining a token cost as a nonlinear function of a number of votes cast may reduce a marginal influence gained by a single token holder casting an increasing number of votes on a recorded proposal.”

Claim 10 · Specification, description of FIG. 6

When a proposal passes

“the nonlinear function is equal to a square of the number of votes cast in the vote; the governance subsystem is configured to determine that the proposal has passed responsive to a participation rate meeting or exceeding a governance quorum and a total number of yes votes exceeding a total number of no votes; and”

Claim 10

What happens to the tokens

“consume a locked token amount corresponding to votes cast on a side of the proposal matching an outcome of the proposal, responsive to the proposal passing, and”

“refund a locked token amount corresponding to votes cast on an opposing side of the proposal.”

“DAO governance module 300 may refund a locked token amount corresponding to a vote cast on each side of a rejected proposal.”

Claim 10 · Specification, description of FIG. 6

The fund keeps a floor

“determine, for a proposed disbursement from the treasury, whether a balance of the treasury after the proposed disbursement would remain at or above a reserve floor, and”

“the reserve floor is calculated from an average disbursement from the treasury over a trailing plurality of ledger intervals, and”

Claims 11 and 12
The sources in fullevery quotation on this page, where it stands

“the nonlinear function is equal to a square of the number of votes cast in the vote; the governance subsystem is configured to determine that the proposal has passed responsive to a participation rate meeting or exceeding a governance quorum and a total number of yes votes exceeding a total number of no votes; and”

VP2.0 · Claim 10

“As an illustrative, non-limiting example, a vote of one unit may accordingly cost one token, and a vote of two units may cost four tokens.”

VP2.0 specification

“consume a locked token amount corresponding to votes cast on a side of the proposal matching an outcome of the proposal, responsive to the proposal passing, and”

VP2.0 · Claim 10

“refund a locked token amount corresponding to votes cast on an opposing side of the proposal.”

VP2.0 · Claim 10

“DAO governance module 300 may refund a locked token amount corresponding to a vote cast on each side of a rejected proposal.”

VP2.0 specification

“determine, for a proposed disbursement from the treasury, whether a balance of the treasury after the proposed disbursement would remain at or above a reserve floor, and”

VP2.0 · Claim 11

“Determining a token cost as a nonlinear function of a number of votes cast may reduce a marginal influence gained by a single token holder casting an increasing number of votes on a recorded proposal.”

VP2.0 specification

“the reserve floor is calculated from an average disbursement from the treasury over a trailing plurality of ledger intervals, and”

VP2.0 · Claim 12